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AGE DISCRIMINATION OF AIRLINE PILOTS:




C ONFLICTING DECISIONS' have been rendered recently
by Federal Courts of Appeals in cases brought by airline
pilots under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA). 2 The persistent denial of certiorari3 by the United
Compare Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 2299 (1982)(holding that airline's refusal to employ forty-eight year
old pilot was a violation of Age Discrimination in Employment Act) with Murnane v.
American Airlines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1770
(1982)(holding that airline's refusal to employ forty-three year old pilot was not a
violation of Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
2 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat.
602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1976)) provides in part that:
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way
which would deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
based on such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply
with this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976).
The legislative history of the ADEA is presented in the following materials:
See H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. REP. No. 723,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Age Discrimination in Employment:
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States Supreme Court in these cases has made it difficult to
interpret the Supreme Court's inclinations in this area of the
law. As a result of the Supreme Court's refusal to address the
issues presented by these conflicting decisions, the Courts of
Appeals will continue their case by case determinations, with
employers never knowing which tests will be used to decide
the fate of their hiring policies until a case is decided in a
particular circuit.
The main issue presented in the ADEA cases which will be
discussed in this comment is whether the employer's refusal
to employ persons age forty and over can be justified as a
"bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ)' - an excep-
tion to the ADEA.5 The conflict of decisions is particularly
noteworthy in the instance of airlines' refusal to hire older pi-
lots. This comment will set forth the various tests being used
at the present time by the circuit courts and will attempt to
justify the decisions holding that the safety of passengers
should be a primary BFOQ consideration.
II. THE ADEA AND THE BFOQ EXCEPTION
In 1967 Congress enacted the ADEA. The purposes of the
ADEA are to promote the employment of older persons based
on ability rather than on age, to prohibit arbitrary age dis-
crimination in employment, and to help workers and employ-
Hearings on Age Discrimination Bills Before the Gen. Subcomm. on
Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967); Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on Age Discrim-
ination Bills Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
3 See supra note 1.
4 The "bona fide occupational qualification" exception provides that:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization-
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsections
(a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section where age is a bona fide occu-
pational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of the particular business, or where the differentiation is
based on reasonable factors other than age.
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976).
Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d at 307.
See supra note 2.
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ers solve the problems associated with the impact of age on
employment.7  An exception to the ADEA provides that
"where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasona-
bly necessary to the normal operation of the particular busi-
ness, or where differentiation is based on reasonable factors
other than age,"' the Act's prohibition against age discrimina-
I H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1967). The ADEA's Congressional
statement of findings and purpose provides as follows:
(a) the Congress hereby finds and declares that -
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers
find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employ-
ment, and especially to regain employment when displaced from
jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for
job performance has become a common practice, and certain
otherwise desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of
older persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term unem-
ployment with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and em-
ployer acceptability is, relative to the younger ages, high among
older workers; their numbers are great and growing; and their
employment problems grave;
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary
discrimination in employment because of age, burdens com-
merce and the free flow of goods in commerce.
(b) It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to promote employment
of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit ar-
bitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age
on employment.
29 U.S.C. § 621 (1976). The House of Representatives General Subcommittee on La-
bor unanimously supported the general purposes of the ADEA, H.R. REP. No. 805,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967), as did the Senate Subcommittee on Labor, S. Rep. No.
723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
8 S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1967). See supra note 4. The House of
Representatives Committee on Education and Labor considered and recommended
various exceptions to the legislation (the ADEA). Those exceptions included the
BFOQ. Another specific exception, which the committee declined to incorporate,
would have allowed for a bona fide management training program. The committee
believed so broad an exception might lead to abuse. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 4-5 (1967).
The committee recognizes, however, that bona fide age requirements
do exist for some positions designed to give employees knowledge and
experience which can reasonably be expected to aid in developing ca-
pabilities required for future advancement to executive, administra-
tive, or professional positions, and expects the Secretary [of Labor] to
appropriately recognize such requirements.
Id. at 5. It is not the purpose of the ADEA to require hiring older workers who do not
otherwise meet the qualifications of the employment. Id. at 7.
19831
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tion does not apply.'
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE BFOQ EXCEPTION TO
THE ADEA
A. In Sex Discrimination Cases
Tests currently being used to decide whether a valid BFOQ
exception exists in age discrimination cases were developed in
sex discrimination cases.10 The following discussion will pre-
sent the facts and decisions in three sex discrimination cases
decided by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. The tests developed in two of these
cases subsequently were combined to provide a two-prong test
which has been applied in a recent age discrimination case in-
volving an airline pilot."
In 1969 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Weeks v.
Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 12 in which the
plaintiff submitted to the defendant her bid for the position
of switchman. Her application was returned with a letter stat-
ing that the defendant did not assign women to that job. 3 Af-
ter an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
investigation of the facts and analysis of the duties of the
switchman's position,"' the EEOC found reason to believe
that the defendant had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964." The plaintiff instituted suit.V 6
9 It is important not to confuse the BFOQ exception with the doctrine of "business
necessity," which operates only in the instance of unintentional discrimination. See
Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 534 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. granted in part,
451 U.S. 906 (1981); Miller v. Texas State Board of Barber Examiners, 615 F.2d 650,
653 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980). See also infra note 136 (discussing
the business necessity test).
10 See infra notes 37-44. A comprehensive discussion of the BFOQ in sex discrimi-
nation cases is set forth in Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification, 55 Txx L. REV. 1025 (1977).
" See infra note 133.
" 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 230.
'4 The fact that a job is strenuous does not bring it within the BFOQ exception
unless sexual characteristics of the employee are crucial for the successful perform-
ance of the job. 14 C.J.S. Civil Rights § 69 (Supp. 1974).
" 408 F.2d at 229-30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (Supp. IV 1980).
"6 408 F.2d at 230.
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At trial, the defendant admitted a prima facie violation of
the Civil Rights Act but asserted the BFOQ exception as an
affirmative defense."7 The federal district court found that the
defendant had satisfied its burden of proving that the job of
switchman was within the BFOQ exception. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, reversed on this point.'8 Stating
that to construe the BFOQ exception broadly would allow the
exception to swallow the rule," the Fifth Circuit held that the
BFOQ exception in sex discrimination cases was to be nar-
rowly interpreted.20 The court further held that "an employer
has the burden of proving that he had a reasonable cause to
believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or sub-
stantially all women would be unable to perform safely and
efficiently the duties of the job involved."2 An alternative to
" Id. at 231-32. There are three procedural steps involved in a discrimination ac-
tion. Those steps were set forth by the court in E.E.O.C. v. County of Allegheny, 519
F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1981). In that case the defendant, the county, had for many
years maintained a policy of refusing to hire individuals over thirty-five for police
officers. Id. at 1330. The main issue was whether defendant's policy could be justified
on either the BFOQ exception or on "reasonable factors other than age." Id. at 1333
(quoting 29 U.S.C § 623(f)(1) (1976)). Prior to its discussion of the BFOQ exception,
the court explained the three procedural steps involved in a discrimination action.
519 F. Supp. at 1331. Those steps are:
(1) Plaintiff bears burden of proof to establish, by a preponderance of
the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination;
(2) If plaintiff satisfies the first step, burden shifts to the defendant to
articulate some legitimate reason for rejection of the applicant;
(3) If the defendant satisfies the second step, the plaintiff is afforded
opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the de-
fendant's reasons are not legitimate, but merely a pretext for age
discrimination.
Id. The court in Allegheny found that the defendant's policy could not be justified on
either ground and enjoined the defendant from enforcing it. Id at 1333. See generally
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980).
The Supreme Court has ruled that only the burden of production, not of proof, shifts
to the defendant once the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of discrimination.
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
IS 408 F.2d at 236.
" "The exception for a 'bona fide occupational qualification' was not intended to
swallow the rule." Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971).
20 408 F.2d at 232. The BFOQ defense has been characterized by the Supreme
Court as "extremely narrow." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977). This
exception is to be narrowly applied. Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361,
370 n.15 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981).
11 408 F.2d at 235. The "all or substantially all" test is the most frequently cited
1983]
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this main Weeks test of a BFOQ was allowed where an em-
ployer demonstrated that it was impossible or highly imprac-
tical to deal with women on an individual basis.22 If an em-
ployer sustains its burden under this alternate test, it may
apply a "reasonable" general rule. 3
Another sex discrimination case brought under Title VII 24
was Diaz v. Pan American World Airways,25 decided by the
Fifth Circuit in 1971. In Diaz, the male plaintiff applied for a
job as a flight cabin attendant with the defendant airline and
was rejected for that position.26 After filing charges with the
EEOC and after conciliation hearings failed, the plaintiff filed
a class action on behalf of himself and others similarly situ-
ated, charging that the defendant had violated the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.27 The defendant admitted that it had discrimi-
nated on the basis of sex, but claimed that its policy came
within the BFOQ exception.28
The district court entered judgment for the defendant
based on a finding that female attendants were superior in the
non-mechanical aspects of the job such as reassuring anxious
passengers and giving courteous service.29 The court found
that passengers' psychological needs were better attended by
female attendants.30 The Fifth Circuit, however, was not con-
vinced that the findings justified the discrimination because
the apparent ability of females to perform the non-mechanical
aspects of the job was tangential to the essence of the business
involved.3' The Fifth Circuit explained that the defendant
test. Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualifi-
cation, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1042 (1977). In theory, this test allows a broadly defined
BFOQ. Only one appellate decision, however, has upheld a BFOQ using the test. Id at
1043. See Long v. California State Personnel Board, 41 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 562 (1974).
2 408 F.2d 235 n.5.
23 Id.
11 See supra note 14.
25 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
11 Id. at 386.
27 Id. See supra note 14.
" 442 F.2d at 386.
I9 d. at 387.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 388.
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could not exclude all males just because most males may not
perform the job adequately. 2 The court stated that "discrimi-
nation based on sex is valid only when the essence of the busi-
ness operation would be undermined by not hiring members
of one sex exclusively. '33 The court's conclusion was that the
essence of the airline business is to transport passengers safely
from one point to another and noted that the test was one of
business necessity, not business convenience.3 '
The third principal test used to decide whether the BFOQ
exception obtains in a sex discrimination case is that an-
nounced in Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co. 5 In that case
the plaintiff, Ms. Rosenfeld, brought an action against her em-
ployer, Southern Pacific, charging a violation of Title VII.3
The plaintiff had applied for the position of agent-telegrapher
at the defendant's office in Thermal, California.3 7 Southern
Pacific had assigned the position instead to a junior male
employee."
Originally the plaintiff had asked for injunctive relief and
damages for the specific discriminatory assignment of the
Thermal position.3 9 A pretrial order was entered, however,
and circumstances surfaced which raised issues regarding the
company's general labor policy. The State of California in-
tervened to defend the state's labor laws.41
The district court issued a summary judgment which pro-
vided, inter alia, that the action of Southern Pacific in refus-
ing to grant the plaintiff the Thermal position was unlawful
32 Id.
I d.
I Id. The Diaz test is narrowly drawn and permits even fewer findings of a BFOQ
than does the Weeks test. In practice, however, courts have interpreted both nar-
rowly. Sirota, supra note 21, at 1044-45.






" Id. The assignment of Ms. Rosenfeld to the agent-telegrapher position would
have put the company in violation of California laws. Id. at 1225. The court decided,
however, that since the state law limitations on female labor ran contrary to the
objectives of Title VII, the state laws were supplanted by Title VII. Id.
19831
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
sex discrimination."2 No damages, however, were awarded,43
and Southern Pacific and the State of California appealed.""
The subsequent closing of the Thermal plant raised a moot-
ness question not relevant here.46
In the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Southern Pacific de-
fended its policy of excluding women generically from certain
jobs based on the arduous nature of the physical activity in-
volved in the jobs."' Southern Pacific concluded that the pol-
icy came within the BFOQ exception. 7 In describing the
agent-telegrapher position, Southern Pacific detailed the work
requirements, which included seasonal ten-hour plus days and
eighty-hour weeks." The job also required heavy physical ef-
fort in climbing and lifting. "
After holding that the discrimination broadly prohibited by
Title VII occurred under Southern Pacific's policy, 50 the court
considered the issue of whether the policy could be upheld as
a BFOQ. The court cited Weeks 1 but instead applied its own
test: that "sexual characteristics, rather than characteristics
that might, to one degree or another, correlate with a particu-
lar sex, must be the basis for the application of the BFOQ
exception."52 The court held that the lower court committed
no error in granting summary judgment" and thus deter-
mined that a BFOQ existed for Southern Pacific's policy. 4
"' Id. at 1221 n.4.
"' Id. at 1220-21.
" Id. at 1221.
11 Id. The case was remanded to the district court to decide the issue of whether
the closing of the Thermal plant rendered the case moot. The district court found
that the case was not moot, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed. Id. at
1222.
16 Id. at 1223. Southern Pacific also argued that the employment of a woman for
the agent-telegrapher position would violate California labor laws. Id. See supra note
41.




51 Id. at 1225.
52 Id.
53 Id.
"4 A commentator has noted that under Rosenfeld, individual testing of applicants
would be unnecessary because knowledge of an applicant's gender would inform the
COMMENTS
B. In Age Discrimination Cases
In Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,55  the trial court
found Greyhound to be in violation of the ADEA because of
its policy of refusing to consider applications for intercity bus
drivers from those persons thirty-five years or older. 6 Grey-
hound claimed that its policy fell within section 4(f)(1) of the
ADEA,57 since age was a "bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business. e58 The trial court applied the burden of proof for-
mulated in Weeks,59 that the employer had reasonable cause
for believing that all or substantially all persons within the
excepted class would be unable to safely and effectively per-
form the duties of the job. 0 The Seventh Circuit was of the
opinion that the Weeks standard applied by the trial court,
while applicable to the particular circumstances 'of that sex
discrimination case, would not be the. proper standard to ap-
ply in Hodgson."' The Weeks test concerned only the welfare
of the applicant, and the Hodgson court was concerned with
the welfare of third persons such as bus passengers and other
motorists as well.62
The Hodgson court reversed the lower court's decision be-
cause it determined that the test formulated in Diaz3 was
more applicable to its decision than the Weeks test since, like
employer whether the applicant possessed the sexual characteristics required for the
job. Sirota, supra note 21, at 1046. A Supreme Court case discussing the need for
individual testing is Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). The state in Dothard
claimed that height and weight requirements for the position of a prison guard were
correlated with strength, which was essential for the successful performance of the
job. Id. at 331. The court did say that if a test which measures strength directly were
developed and administered fairly, it would statisfy Title VII standards because it
would "measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract." Id.;
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
55 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom., Brennan v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
499 F.2d at 859.
I' d. at 861. See supra note 2.
'8 499 F.2d at 861. See supra note 4.
499 F.2d at 861. See supra notes 11-20.
80 499 F.2d at 861.
I /d.
e' Id.
I d. at 862. See supra notes 23-32.
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the airline industry, the essence of the bus industry is the safe
transportation of its passengers.64 The Diaz test requires only
that the employer prove that hiring those within the excepted
class would undermine the essence of the business operation, 5
that being the safe transportation of passengers.6 The Hodg-
son court held that Greyhound had to prove only that elimi-
nation of the hiring policy based on age might jeopardize the
life of just one more person than might otherwise occur under
the present hiring procedure.6
In Hodgson, the plaintiff contended that a person aged
forty to sixty-five should be judged based on his "functional
age," ' his capacity to do the job, rather than on his chrono-
logical age. 9 Even accepting the argument that physical ex-
aminations could effectively screen out degenerative disabili-
ties which affect the driving skills of persons in the forty to
sixty-five age bracket, 0 the appellate court questioned
whether Greyhound could practically scrutinize the older
drivers on a regular and frequent basis.7' In holding for the
defendant, the court of appeals determined that functional
age was not practicably or readily discernible.72
The two-pronged test 78 to determine the validity of a
BFOQ was announced in Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours Inc.74
In Usery, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from
denying employment to individuals protected by the ADEA
and from withholding payment of wages allegedly due eight
men who sought and were denied employment as intercity bus
drivers.7 ' The defendant admitted that it refused to consider
the applications of two of the men solely because of their
Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d at 862.
" Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d at 388.
" Id.
Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d at 863.





71 See infra notes 52-61.
74 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
7' Id. at 226-27.
COMMENTS
ages7 6 but that the other six were excluded for reasons other
than age."
The trial court entered judgment for the defendant.78 The
court concluded that the defendant had demonstrated that a
factual basis existed for its belief that all or substantially all
men over forty could not perform the duties of the job effi-
ciently and safely.79 Additionally, the trial court found that
recurring physical examinations and other tests to determine
mental and psychological problems associated with aging
would be impractical and untrustworthy.8 0
In affirming the trial court's judgment, the appellate court
in Usery stated that the threshold obstacle to be overcome by
the defendant when claiming a BFOQ defense is the test set
forth in Diaz,81 that the job qualifications invoked by the em-
ployer to justify his age discrimination must be reasonably
necessary to the essence of the business.8 2 Once the defendant
has overcome the Diaz obstacle, it is still required to justify
its discrimination as a BFOQ under the Weeks element. The
Weeks test allows proof either that the defendant has a fac-
tual basis for believing that all or substantially all applicants
over forty would be unable to perform the job safely and effi-
ciently or that there is no reliable way to differentiate the
qualified applicants from the unqualified applicants in the
class. 83 Thus, the Usery court developed a two-pronged test
for a BFOQ based on the holdings in Diaz and Weeks. In
holding that the trial court's findings were not clearly errone-
ous,"' the appellate court emphasized the testimony presented
by a doctor, one of the defendant's witnesses. The doctor tes-
tifed that: (1) certain physiological and psychological changes
that accompany the aging process decrease the person's abil-
76 Id. at 227. The two complaining witnesses whose applications were denied solely
because of their ages were forty-three and fifty-seven. Id.
I1 d. at 227. The remaining six witnesses were ages forty-one to fifty-three.
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ity to drive safely and (2) even the most refined examinations
cannot detect all of these changes."'
In Arritt v. Grisell,8 the plaintiff applied for the job of a
police officer in Moundsville, West Virginia, and his applica-
tion was denied. 7 The sole ground for the denial was that he
was forty years old and was therefore ineligible to take the
physical and mental examinations required by a West Virginia
law. This law established an eighteen to thirty-five age limit
for initial appointment to the position of police officer.88 The
plaintiff sued the city and three members of the Police Civil
Service Commission, 8 claiming that, inter alia,0 the defen-
88 Id. at 237.
88 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977).
81 Id. at 1269.
88 Id.
8* Id.
0o In addition to plaintiff's claim that defendant violated the ADEA, the court fur-
ther addressed plaintiff's specific claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that defendant's
action and policy violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this sec-
tion, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Co-
lumbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 96-170, 93 Stat. 1284 (currently codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (Supp. IV 1980)).The Arritt court justified denying the plaintiff's claim citing
the Supreme Court holdings in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307 (1976), and San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In
Murgia the Court upheld a Massachusetts statute which established a mandatory re-
tirement age of fifty for uniformed state police officers against an equal protection
clause challenge. In applying Rodriguez, the Arritt court stated that an equal protec-
tion analysis requires strict scrutiny of a classification only when that classification
interferes with a fundamental right or disadvantages a suspect class. 567 F.2d at
1271-72. Regarding "suspect class," see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971)(alienage); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)(race). Further, the Ar-
ritt court concluded that since strict judicial scrutiny is not required, the proper stan-
dard is rationality, that is, whether the classification is rationally related to furthering
a legitimate state interest. 567 F.2d at 1272. The Arritt court reasoned that the plain-
tiff's equal protection clause claim failed because the State of West Virginia had a
legitimate state interest in assuring the physical preparedness of police officers. Id.
COMMENTS
dants had violated the ADEA." The plaintiff sought unpaid
wages, damages, costs and fees, and an injunction requiring
the defendants to employ him as a police officer.2 The trial
court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants,9 3
who claimed that age was a BFOQ.'4 The plaintiff's motion to
rebut the defendant's BFOQ affidavit was denied.95
The trial court had applied the Hodgson test,96 that the em-
ployer had merely to demonstrate a "minimal increase in risk
of harm for it is enough to show that elimination of the hiring
policy might jeopardize the life of one more person than
might otherwise occur under the present hiring practice. 9 7
The court of appeals in Arritt, however, reversed and re-
manded, holding that the Usery two-pronged test was the
proper standard to be applied" rather than the Hodgson test.
The court of appeals remanded the case to allow the plaintiff
an opportunity to rebut the defendant's BFOQ affidavit.99
IV. RECENT APPLICATION OF THE BFOQ EXCEPTION IN CASES
INVOLVING AGE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST AIRLINE PILOTS
In Murnane v. American Airlines,"00 a forty-three year old
pilot applied for a position as flight officer with the defendant
airline.10' The position of flight officer was the first of three
employment levels at American - flight officer, co-pilot, and
captain - that ultimately lead to captaincy.'02 American's
policy was for all persons hired for flight officer to advance to
captain;'03 this is referred to as an "up-or-out" policy.'0 4 The






Id.; Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d at 863.
" 567 F.2d at 1271.
"Id.
100 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1770 (1982).
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airline also has a general guideline against hiring anyone older
than thirty as a flight officer. 0
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint 0 6 be-
cause it found that American had established a BFOQ and
that the plaintiff would not have been hired in any event be-
cause he was not competitively qualified.10 7 In affirming the
trial court's findings, 0 8 the Murnane court, acknowledging
that American's policy was to refuse to hire persons over the
age of thirty for the beginning position in the cockpit,109 ad-
dressed the guideline as if it were aged forty." 0 The appellate
court noted that those persons age thirty to forty were not
within the class intended to be protected by the ADEA."'
Even though American admitted that there were economic
reasons for hiring younger pilots who would spend more time
as captains, the court saw this benefit as merely collateral, not
overriding safety aspects." 2 Those safety aspects were
brought out at trial.' s Evidence was adduced which indicated
200 Id. at 99-100.
'" Id. at 100.
107 Id.
208 Id. at 102.
'09 Id. at 100.
,20 Id. at 100 n.3. Section 631 provides:
Age limits.
Individuals who are at least 40 but less than 70 years of age
(a) The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who
are at least 40 years of age but less than 70 years of age.
29 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. III 1979). Section 631 has been interpreted as follows:
Although section 4 of the (ADEA) broadly makes unlawful various
types of age discrimination by employers, employment agencies, and
labor organizations, section 12 limits this protection to individuals who
are at least 40 years of age but less than 65(70) years of age. Thus, for
example it is unlawful in situations where (the ADEA) applies, for an
employer to discriminate in hiring or in any other way by giving pref-
erence because of age to an individual 30 years old over another indi-
vidual who is within the 40-65(70) age bracket limitation of section 12.
Similarly, an employer will have violated the (ADEA), in situations
where it applies, when one individual within the age bracket of 40-
65(70) is given job preference in hiring, assignment, promotion or any
other term, condition, or privilege of employment, on the basis of age,
over another individual within the same age bracket.
29 C.F.R. § 860.91(a) (1981).
667 F.2d at 100 n.3; 29 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. III 1979).
Murnane, 667 F.2d at 101 n.6.
Id. at 100.
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that pilot error accounted for ninety percent of all aviation
accidents, but that aviation accidents decreased with in-
creased pilot experience.' 14 American introduced evidence
which showed that the best experience an American captain
could have would be acquired by flying American's aircraft in
its three cockpit positions." 5
The court noted that under American's system it took ten
to fifteen years to advance to captain, and that if the appli-
cant had been hired as a flight officer in his forties, it was
probable that he would not have become a captain until his
late fifties."' Since the Federal Aviation Adminstration re-
quires commercial airline pilot retirement at age sixty," 7 the
plaintiff would have been able to serve as a captain only
briefly before mandatory retirement."18 The ADEA, however,
sought to exclude economic considerations from being the ba-
sis for a BFOQ." 9 Essentially, in order to compare the costs
associated with hiring older workers (pilots) with the costs of
hiring younger workers (pilots), it would be necessary to clas-




117 Id. 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1982). Compulsory age limits on hiring which are
imposed by statutes, regulations, or employer's rules and Which apply regardless of
the employee's condition at the time of termination appear to be bona fide occupa-
tional qualifications when the conditions are imposed clearly for the convenience and
safety of the public. 15 Am. Jur. 2d Civil Rights § 239 (1976).
I18 Murnane, 667 F.2d at 100.
11 In setting forth Congress' purpose in enacting the ADEA, the C.F.R. states that:
[iut should also be made clear that a general assertion that the average
cost of employing older workers as a group is higher than the average
cost of employing younger workers as a group will not be recognized as
a differentiation under the terms and provisions of the (ADEA), unless
one of the other statutory exceptions applies. To classify or group em-
ployees solely on the basis of age foi the purpose of comparing costs,
or for any other purpose, necessarily rests on the assumption that the
age factor alone may be used to justify a differentiation - an assump-
tion plainly contrary to the terms of the (ADEA) and the purpose of
the Congress in enacting it. Differentials so based would serve only to
perpetuate and promote the very discrimination at which the (ADEA)
is directed.
29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1981).
120 Id.
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specifically prohibited by the ADEA and was the very reason
for its passage. 1 ' Therefore, a claim that it is more expensive
to hire older pilots than younger pilots would not be a suffi-
cient basis for a BFOQ. The Murnane court determined, how-
ever, that if the benefit of hiring younger pilots was merely
incidental to the safety aspects, that benefit would not be suf-
ficient to declare the BFOQ invalid. 2'
In dismissing the plaintiff's complaint, the Murnane court
held that the maximization of safety was "reasonably neces-
sary to the normal operation" of the airline.2 3 The court also
stated that safe transportation of passengers was the "es-
sence" of American's business. 24 In the judgment of the
court, the airline industry was to be accorded "great leeway
and discretion" to determine how the industry may be oper-
ated most safely.'25
One commentator1'2 has pointed out that the Murnane
court applied only the Diaz prong, i.e., the undermining of the
essence of the business. The commentator concludes that by
ignoring the Weeks prong, the requirement of a factual basis
for the employer's belief that all or substantially all persons to
be excepted would be unable to perform the duties of the job
safely and efficiently or that it is impractical to deal with a
class of persons on an individualized basis, the Murnane court
"implicitly acknowledged that these technological advances
may be used to deny prospective pilots a position without de-
priving an entire class of persons the opportunity to be con-
sidered for jobs.' 27 The commentator further notes that a
principal area of dispute in cases involving age discrimination
against pilots is whether the advancements in medical science
have made it possible to predict accurately the occurrence of
121 Id.
"' Murnane, 667 F.2d at 101 n.6.
I'l Id. at 101.
1 I4 d.
12o Id.
'" Rosenblum, Age Discrimination in Employment and the Permissibility of Oc-
cupational Age Restrictions, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1261, 1269-74 (1981).
'" Id. at 1274 n.69.
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inflight disabilities of pilots. "8
Just one week after Murnane was decided by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, the Fourth Circuit de-
cided Smallwood v. United Air Lines.'29 In Smallwood, the
plaintiff applied to United Air Lines (United) for a position as
a flight officer in August of 1977. " At that time he was forty-
eight years old and had ten years experience with Overseas
National Airways in the positions of first officer and cap-
tain. 3 ' United's response to his application was a form letter
which listed its basic qualifications, and next to "Age 21
through 29 "132 a light pencil mark appeared.13 3 The letter
stated that United would offer no encouragement but would
keep the application on file. 1 4 The plaintiff replied that in
light of the "national policy against age discrimination in em-
ployment,"135 United should reconsider his application.13 6 In
December 1977, United wrote to the plaintiff telling him that
it was processing applications only from applicants twenty-
one to thirty-five years of age.13 7 In March 1978, the plaintiff
filed a charge against United with the Wage and Hour Divi-
sion of the Department of Labor, "18 which resulted in unsuc-
cessful conciliation hearings.13 9 The plaintiff then sued United
in federal court, asserting an ADEA claim.14 0
At trial, the defendant presented evidence to prove that air-
line safety would be adversely affected by the hiring of pilots
"I Id. at 1272.
1-9 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2299 (1982).
"o Id. at 305.







1S Id. All functions previously vested by section 623 in the Secretary of Labor or
the Civil Service Commission were transferred to the EEOC by Reorg. Plan No. 1 of
1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807 (1978). The plan is set out in the Appendix to Title 5,
Government Organization and Employees, and became effective January 1, 1979. Sec-
tion 1-101 of Ex. Ord. No. 12106 provided for this transfer. Exec. Order No. 12,106,
44 Fed. Reg. 1053 (1980).
13 661 F.2d at 306.
140 Id.
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over the age of thirty-five;"' The defendant contended that
the age limitation was a BFOQ because hiring older pilots
would impede its "crew concept"' 42 - the safe, effective and
coordinated functioning of its three officers in the cockpit 43
- and that the hiring of older pilots would disproportionately
increase the chance of inflight medical emergencies." 44 The
trial court ruled for the defendant, adopting most of the de-
fendant's proposed findings of fact.'14
The plaintiff appealed and the defendant cross-appealed.' 46
In reversing the trial court's ruling,"14 the Fourth Circuit re-
sponded to the defendant's "crew concept" claim, that pilots
from other airlines would not be able to integrate successfully
with United-trained pilots. 48 The court noted that evidence
indicated that most new pilots were hired from the ranks of





'" Id. at 307.
'" Id. at 304. Defendant cross-appealed, contending that Smallwood's claim was
time barred by 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1980), which allows only 180 days for
a discrimination claim to be filed. Section 626 (Supp. IV 1980) provides:
Filing of charge with Commission; timeliness, conciliation, conference,
and persuasion
(d) No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this
section until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination
has been filed with the Commission. Such a charge shall be filed -
(1) within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred; or
(2) in a case to which section 633(b) of this title applies, within 300
days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, or within 30 days
after receipt by the individual of notice of termination of proceedings
under State law, whichever is earlier.
Upon receiving such a charge, the Commission shall promptly notify
all persons named in such charge as prospective defendants in the ac-
tion and shall promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice
by informal methods of conciliation, concurrence, and persuasion.
The trial court found that even though the August 24, 1977, letter from United to
Smallwood comprised the act of discrimination, equitable considerations tolled the
statute. The Fourth Circuit held that the second letter, which was dated December
12, 1977, was the first discriminatory act and as such occurred within the 180 day
time limitation. 661 F.2d at 309.
. 661 F.2d at 309.
"0 Id. at 308.
149 Id.
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concept" was a function of prior experience and not the age of
the pilot at the time he is hired. 1 0 The appellate court also
held that the defendant failed to establish its claim that the
chance of increased medical emergencies should be a BFOQ
consideration.""' Noting that the preventive medical examina-
tions would have the same screening effect on newly hired pi-
.lots as they would on career United pilots" 2 and that the de-
fendant's physical examination program was effective in
detecting potentially disabling medical problems, " the appel-
late court held that the defendant had failed to show a rela-
tionship between the age at hire of pilots and airline safety.1
4
The test adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Arritt, the two-
pronged test, was applied by the Smallwood court to hold
that the airline's refusal to employ a forty-eight year old pilot
was a violation of the ADEA. 155 The defendant, in addition to
claims of "crew concept"'' 6 impairment and increased medical
emergencies, contended that hiring older pilots would cause
economic detriment.' 57 The appellate court stated that eco-




152 Id. at 309.
,. Id. at 308-9.
, Id. at 309.
'5 Id. at 307.
I" See supra notes 126-128.
57 Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d at 307.
I" Id. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court faced a situa-
tion in which ability tests were excluding more Negroes than whites from certain
higher paying jobs at a power generating plant in North Carolina. The Court in that
case seemed to leave open the question of whether job requirements which test for an
applicant's capacity for future promotion could be justified on a showing of genuine
business need. Id. at 432. Even though Griggs is a case involving racial discrimina-
tion, such cases are closely tied to age discrimination cases because Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (Supp. IV 1980), and the ADEA
are similar. Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1270 n. 11 (4th Cir. 1977). Speeches made
in both houses of Congress in connection with the passage of the ADEA referred to
the proposed ban on age discrimination as justifed on bases similar to those support-
ing Title VII racial discrimination prohibitions. Id. In recognizing that the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 proscribes practices that may be fair in form but operate to dis-
criminate, the Griggs Court stated that the "touchstone is business necessity." Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 424, 431 (1971). If an employment practice cannot be
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V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
Even in view of the congressional mandate that an airline is
required to operate with the "highest possible degree"' " of
care, the Smallwood court reached a decision that extends the
Arritt decision to the airline industry.160 The two-pronged test
formulated in Usery'61 and adopted in Arritt' 2 was used to
show that the refusal to hire pilots over the age of thirty-five
based solely on their age was not a BFOQ. 163 The Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision in Smallwood is in direct conflict with the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Court's earlier decision in Murnane,
that the refusal to hire pilots over the age of forty was a
BFOQ.1' 4 The Murnane court accepted the contention that
safety of transportation of airline passengers would be ad-
versely affected by requiring the air carriers to hire the older
pilots,'1" while the Smallwood court held that the airline had
failed to show a relationship between the age of pilots at hire
and airline safety.1" Further, the Murnane court stressed that
safe operation is not sufficient, that "safest" air transportation
is the goal 167 and that courts do not have the expertise to
substitute their judgment for that of the airline.""
The Smallwood court was of the opinion that United was
attempting to claim a BFOQ based on economic considera-
tions "I while the Murnane court saw American's similar pol-
icy as providing only collateral economic benefits. 170 It should
be reemphasized that the Murnane court recognized that eco-
shown to relate to job performance, then that practice is prohibited. Id. The Court
also noted that during the attempts to succeed in passing Title VII, proponents of the
bill assured critics that job-related tests would not be affected and that the very in-
tent of the bill was to promote hiring on the basis of job qualifications. Id. at 434.
'9 Murnane, 667 F.2d at 101 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1421(b) (1976)).
"0 Smallwood, 661 F.2d at 307.
1 See supra notes 59-61.
Arritt, 567 F.2d at 1271.
'' Smallwood, 661 F.2d at 307.
"' Murnane, 667 F.2d at 100.
'I ld. at 101.
. Smallwood, 661 F.2d at 309.
107 Murnane, 667 F.2d at 101.
168 Id.
'89 Smallwood, 661 F.2d at 307.
370 Murnane, 667 F.2d at 101 n.6.
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nomic benefits existed for American if it were to continue to
hire only younger pilots.1 71 These younger pilots would ulti-
mately serve more years as captains. 72 The Murnane court,
however, saw these economic benefits as only collateral, inci-
dental to American's otherwise valid BFOQ which provided
substantial safety benefits to the public.17
3
Neither the Murnane nor the Smallwood courts applied the
Rosenfeld "sexual characteristics" test.'7 4 The other tests,
Diaz and Weeks, have withstood the shift of focus from sex
discrimination to age discrimination. It appears, however, that
the "sexual characteristics" test is not applied to a case in-
volving age discrimination.
In view of the recent bankruptcy of Braniff Airways, Inc., 5
and the resulting unemployment of experienced pilots,76 the
Smallwood decision could be important both from the stand-
point of precedent and as setting policy. The Supreme Court
denied certiorari in the Smallwood case. 77 It is difficult, how-
ever, to determine the Supreme Court's inclinations in this
area of the law because it also denied certiorari in Mur-
nane.17 8 Murnane could also be important from the stand-
point of precedent and as setting policy - policy and prece-
dent in conflict with Smallwood. The Smallwood decision,
obviously, favors Braniff pilots. The Smallwood court's re-
quirement that the employer pass the two-pronged Usery
test 7 1 resulted in a holding which struck down the airline's




174 Rosenfeld, 444 F.2d at 1225. See supra notes 32a-32t and accompanying text.
178 Gregory, Braniff Bites the Dust, 116 AvIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 24,
1982, at 11.
17 Id. Many Braniff senior employees, like those of most pioneer airlines are too
old to find jobs easily. These senior employees are also too young to draw social
secruity. Furthermore, their pensions are in limbo. Id.
.7 661 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2299 (1982).
78 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1770 (1982).
17 Smallwood, 661 F.2d at 307. The Smallwood opinion only mentions Arritt, but
the Arritt court had adopted the two-pronged test formulated in Usery. See supra
note 76.
180 Id. at 304.
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The fact that the courts have issued conflicting decisions
should not be surprising. Congress has given the airline indus-
try two mandates which are seemingly in conflict. An airline is
expected to exercise the highest possible degree of safety in
transporting passengers,8 " and yet the ADEA prohibits age
discrimination in the hiring of those responsible for the safety
of the passengers. 8 ' Even though economic benefits as a basis
for a BFOQ are excluded,' the courts, and eventually the air
passengers, are still left with problems associated with the
natural process of aging, from which pilots are not immune. 84
VI. CONCLUSION
The risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant for the
position of airline flight officer are staggering. 8 5 In noting this
obvious fact, the Hodgson court stated:
When a job requires a small amount of skill and training and
the consequences of hiring an unqualified applicant are insig-
nificant, the courts should examine closely any pre-employ-
ment standard or criteria which discriminate against minorities
(older persons). In such a case, the employer should have a
heavy burden to demonstrate to the court's satisfaction that
his employment criteria are job related. On the other hand,
when the job clearly requires a high degree of skill and the eco-
nomic and human risks involved in hiring an unqualified appli-
cant are great, the employer bears a correspondingly lighter
burden to show that his employment criteria are job related.'
181 Murnane, 667 F.2d at 101. 49 U.S.C. § 1421(b) (1976) states as follows:
In prescribing standards, rules, and regulations, and in issuing certifi-
cates under this subchapter, the Secretary of Transportation shall give
full consideration to the duty resting upon air carriers to perform their
services with the highest possible degree of safety in the public inter-
est and to any differences between air transportation and other air
commerce; and he shall make classifications of such standards, rules,
regulations, and certificates appropriate to the differences betweeen air
transportation and other air commerce.
Id.
182 See supra note 2.
'8' See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
184 Smallwood, 661 F.2d at 307.
18I Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 862.
*186 Id. Spurlock v. United Air Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir. 1972).
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Perhaps the various tests are producing inconsistent results
because any explicitly defined test to be applied in this area
would be insufficient. What the courts are actually addressing
when an airline attempts to invoke a BFOQ exception are the
conflicting rights of two classes of persons - those persons
forty and over desiring to be employed as airline pilots and
those persons who expect and require safe air travel on com-
mercial carriers. Each class has been recognized by Congress
as deserving protection, and the courts must address these
conflicting rights. Since the Supreme Court has refused to
hear the cases involving the BFOQ as applied to age discrimi-
nation of airline pilots, the circuit courts will continue their
case by case determinations, with employers never knowing
which tests will be used to determine the fate of their hiring
policies until a case is decided in a particular circuit. Since
pilot error can be so devastating, courts should be encouraged
to follow the balancing analysis stated by the Hodgson court
and place upon the airline a lighter burden in this area where
the human risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant
are great.
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